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This paper examines possible avenues to salvage national retirement programs. 
It first proposes changes to the system which would in theory entice Americans 
to remain in the work force at older ages, such as adjusting the retirement 
age, expanding the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings calculation base, es-
tablishing a ‘paid-up’ category for payroll taxes, establishing Medicare as the 
primary payer for working seniors, and reducing or eliminating regulations 
that prevent men and women from gradually retiring. The paper then turns to 
look at the effect of policy changes on labor force participation. The data is 
processed with an Ordinary Least Squares estimator. The results of the eight 
regressions were mixed, and are discussed in detail within the paper.
Introduction
By now, it is common knowledge that demographic trends over the next twenty to thirty 
years will require a major overhaul of our national retirement programs. Escalating costs 
(both observed and projected) of these programs necessitate serious examination of current 
policy to identify reforms which will aid sustainability. The impending retirement of the 
‘baby-boom’ generation makes such study all the more timely. A growing body of literature 
has emerged around the idea that retirement systems can be adjusted to encourage workers 
to remain in the labor force for longer periods of time. Longer careers, it is argued, will 
help to keep the system functioning under the demographic stresses imposed by a skewed 
population distribution and the growing cost of medical care. 
Unfortunately, as the system stands now, various policies in Social Security, 
Medicare, and pension plans create significant disincentives for older workers who wish 
to remain in the labor market. One Urban Institute study found that the implicit tax rate on 
work rose from 14 percent at age 55 to nearly 50 percent at age 70.1 This paper will exam-
ine proposals to reduce or eliminate economic disincentives for longer careers and attempt 
to model labor force participation decisions at older ages for men and women.
http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit
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The Proposals
Adjusting the Retirement Age
One of the most straightforward proposals is an across the board increase in both the early 
and normal retirement ages for social security benefits. Currently, the Early Retirement 
Age (ERA) stands at 62, while the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) stands at 67 for work-
ers born after 1960. Some propose automatic increases based on average life expectancy,2 
while others propose changes in either the NRA or ERA, but not both.
Because Social Security payments are actuarially adjusted to ensure that lifetime 
benefits paid to retirees remain the same, regardless of retirement date, changes in the ERA 
and NRA will have different effects on retirement incentives. Increases in the ERA will 
delay the earliest age at which seniors can draw Social Security, but will have little effect 
on the lifetime value of Social Security payments to any given retiree. However, an adjust-
ment in the NRA will have no effect on the age at which seniors can begin to draw Social 
Security payments, but will instead change the lifetime value of such payments.
In theory, an increase in the NRA should lead to an increase in average retirement 
age. Lower lifetime benefits will necessitate that workers remain in the workforce for 
longer periods of time in order to reach the same levels of consumption in retirement. 
However, Burtless and Quinn argue in a 2000 paper that increases in the NRA without 
accompanying increases in the ERA would lead short sighted workers to retire ‘too early’ 
and that the social security benefits received in retirement would be insufficient to support 
these workers.3 They suggest that the ERA must keep pace with the NRA if Social Security 
is to appropriately serve seniors.
This does not mean that ERA reform proposals are without objection. Many work-
ers are unable to continue working past age 62, due either to health constraints or to the 
physical demands of the workplace.4 Any increase in the retirement age will simply shift 
this group of people off the rolls of Social Security at the cost of an expanded disability 
program. Additionally, increases in the ERA have adverse effects on workers with shorter 
than average lifespans. As African-Americans and low income workers tend to have short-
er lifespans, reforms to the ERA will disproportionately harm these groups, and may be 
branded by some as discriminatory.5
Regardless of the objections, changes to the ERA must be a central part of any 
reform. According to a 2006 Urban Institute Discussion Paper, few retirees look to the 
long-term effects of their retirement decisions, instead evaluating their options at a single 
point in time.6 In other words, benefit availability is more important than benefit amounts.7 
As long as Social Security payments, no matter how small, are available at age 62, workers 
will begin to evaluate their retirement options at that time.
Expanding the AIME Calculation Base
Another proposal to encourage later retirement ages would expand the base used to cal-
culate the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME).8 The AIME, which is used in the 
formula for determining Social Security benefits for retirees, is currently computed by 
averaging the highest 35 years of earnings for a beneficiary. Should a beneficiary work 
fewer than 35 years, the calculation imputes zeros for years that they received no income.
As a result, beneficiaries face a strong disincentive to work for longer than 35 years. 
In the 35th year of work, earnings are still replacing zeros in the calculation of AIME, but in 
the 36th year, earnings begin to replace years of lower income. Workers increase their future 
benefits at a significantly slower rate, but continue to pay payroll taxes at normal levels. 
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Expanding the AIME base to calculate average earnings over forty years, as opposed to the 
thirty-five year calculation under current law, delays the effect of this disincentive by five 
years. In short, it rewards workers who remain in the workforce for longer periods of time 
while penalizing those who leave the workforce early.
AIME base expansion proposals function similarly to the NRA increases mentioned 
above. Both reforms result in a benefit decrease without an increase the early retirement 
age – allowing workers to potentially retire too early to sufficiently provide for consump-
tion in retirement. AIME reform, however, focuses on career length, while NRA reform 
focuses on age. The practical consequence of these reforms is that increases in NRA repre-
sent across the board benefit cuts to all retirees, while the AIME reforms limit benefit cuts 
only to retirees with shorter careers. 
Establish a ‘Paid Up’ Category for Payroll Taxes
While expanding the AIME base to include 40 years does push back a significant disin-
centive to work by an additional 5 years, it does not eliminate the disincentive. The disin-
centive, however, could be weakened or eliminated with the establishment of a ‘paid-up’ 
category for payroll taxes. One approach would have all retirees who reach the maximum 
number of AIME indexed years of work (35 under current law) exempted from the Social 
Security segment of payroll taxes.9 Other approaches would have workers exempted from 
Social Security contributions after reaching the NRA.10 Both function similarly – greatly 
reducing current incentives to retire early.
If Social Security is truly to be considered as retirement savings and not as in-
come redistribution from workers to retirees, it would seem that individuals should no 
longer be required to pay into the system when they have hit the savings cap imposed by 
the AIME. To do otherwise would impose a tax for which seniors receive no benefit – a 
significant contributor to the increase in labor disincentives. A June 2006 study by the 
Urban Institute found that exempting seniors past the normal retirement age from addi-
tional Social Security contributions would lower the “implicit tax rate on work at ages 66 
and older” by 10 percentage points. 
Ensure High Income Earners with Short Careers Face the Same Progressivity
High income workers face additional disincentives to work at older ages because of the 
method with which benefits calculation introduces progressivity. AIME is not calculated 
by using a numerical average – instead earnings are averaged over a 35 year long career, 
even if their actual career was much shorter. High income workers with short careers are 
treated in the same way as low income workers with long careers. A worker who earns 
$100,000 a year for 10 years has the same AIME as a worker who earns $33,333 a year for 
30 years, and will receive the same monthly benefits, despite the fact that he had a much 
shorter career. By retiring earlier, high income workers can artificially lower their AIME so 
that Social Security treats them as lower income workers.
One proposal addresses this issue by calculating AIME only for the years in which 
a worker had actual income.11 The progressive schedule is then applied, so that AIME in 
excess of the various bend points is reduced by the appropriate amount. After the appro-
priate progressive changes are made, the final Social Security benefits are calculated and 
reduced proportionately according to career length. In the case above, the high income 
worker’s income would be calculated as if his AIME were $100,000, but his final benefits 
would be only 10/35th of their calculated value. In the long run, this proposal would again 
decrease benefits paid to workers with shorter careers, and prevent higher income workers 
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from escaping the progressive schedule by shortening their careers and artificially depress-
ing their AIME. 
Establish Medicare as the Primary Payer for Working Seniors
Perhaps the most significant disincentive for workers over the age of 65 is the establish-
ment of Medicare as the secondary payer for seniors with alternative healthcare coverage.12 
When older workers consume health care goods and services and have health coverage 
sponsored by their employer, the employer’s health plan is the first to pay costs. Medicare 
will only provide coverage to these seniors if their employer’s health plan does not cover a 
cost or procedure that would be covered under normal Medicare coverage.
Essentially, this rule results in the loss of most, if not all, Medicare benefits for em-
ployed seniors. While seniors do not actually face reduced health coverage (they are still 
covered under their employer’s health plans), most economists agree that they pay for this 
coverage in the form of lower salaries. If we accept this to be the case, Medicare eligible 
workers are paying for health coverage that they would otherwise receive from Medicare 
for free. The practical consequence of the second payer rule in Medicare is a direct revoca-
tion of benefits for those seniors who chose to continue work. No policy could be a more 
obvious example of a work disincentive.
The solution to such a problem is simple: repeal the federal laws requiring Medicare 
to act only as a second payer. Seniors over 65 who are eligible for Medicare should be al-
lowed to claim their benefits – especially when they continue to be productive members 
of the workforce. Businesses will be more willing to employ seniors if they are no longer 
expected to provide expensive health coverage, and seniors will enjoy higher wages in the 
labor market. One study found that such a policy change would cut implicit tax rates at ages 
65 and older by more than 10 percent.13
Reduce or Eliminate Regulations that Prevent Phased Retirement Programs
Many seniors would like to gradually reduce their hours and ease themselves into retire-
ment, rather than face a choice between full time work or full time retirement.14 If phased 
retirement programs were available to seniors, it is likely that some would be willing to 
remain in the workforce for a longer duration on a part time basis.15 Unfortunately, many 
federal regulations prevent or discourage employers from developing such programs.16
Phased retirement programs must successfully navigate three complex statutes in 
order to be deemed legal – the tax code, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).17 All three statutes are 
well meaning but broadly written directives that can make phased retirement difficult for 
both employers and seniors – eventually harming the very citizens they were designed to 
protect. Even when programs are completely legal, the threat of civil action under one of 
these statutes can be expensive and may nonetheless discourage development of programs.
As an example, under the ERISA, defined benefit pension plans may not be drawn 
by employees who still work for the plan sponsor.18 In most cases, however, as workers 
shift towards part time employment, they need to draw additional resources from their pen-
sion funds to support their consumption. The ERISA forbids such withdrawals. The ERISA 
also prevents employers from altering benefit formulas in pension programs in ways that 
would reduce benefits previously earned by retirees. While this measure serves to protect 
pensions earned by workers, its unfortunate consequence is to discourage employers from 
experimenting with potentially costly phased retirement programs.
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The tax code complicates matters by constructing a labyrinthine system of rules and 
regulations to dictate when benefits can be paid, to whom they can be paid and how they 
will be taxed.19 The IRS does not clearly define what constitutes a termination of work, and 
it presents no clear regulatory framework for a phased retirement program.
The ADEA, designed to prevent age discrimination in the workplace, also cre-
ates navigational hazards for companies seeking to develop phased retirement programs. 
Strictly speaking, phased retirement programs are discriminatory in nature, as they treat 
older workers differently on the basis of age. Developing phased retirement programs 
increases corporate exposure to ADEA claims, even when phased retirement programs 
benefit both employers and retirees. The ADEA also limits flexibility in wages and 
benefits paid to elderly workers, as benefit cuts may lead to claims of age discrimina-
tion in the workplace. This wage and benefit flexibility could help keep seniors in the 
workforce, but ADEA claims cause employers to be reluctant to hire and retain senior 
workers.
Rudolph Penner, with the Urban Institute, suggests that the best solution for the 
regulatory nightmare faced by employers wishing to establish phased retirement programs 
is to create a new statute amending the ERISA, ADEA and tax code which would specifi-
cally lay out approved methods of implementing phased retirement programs.20 Without 
such a statute, employers will have to wait for regulatory agencies and the courts to sort out 
which kinds of retirement programs are acceptable – and which are not.
Labor Supply Elasticity
Of course, without a realistic understanding of the labor supply elasticity it is impossible 
to determine how any of these proposals will affect the labor force participation rate of se-
niors. Such an understanding is the goal of our empirical model, however, we first examine 
two previous studies of senior labor supply elasticity.
The first study, conducted by Gary V. Engelhardt and Anil Kumar derives its esti-
mate from data following the repeal of the Social Security earnings test for those aged 65-
69 in 2000. Using available data from the 1996-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS), they found that the repeal of the earnings test increased labor supply on the 
intensive margin by 12-17%, the bulk of which was concentrated among men with a high-
school degree, whose labor supply rose by 19-26%.21 According to the study, however, 
“the impact of the repeal appears only on the intensive margin; there is no evidence that 
the repeal increased labor-force participation.”22 Under the assumption that older men view 
the earnings test as a pure tax on earnings, these estimates translate into uncompensated 
labor-supply elasticity’s of 0.24-0.34.
A second study, conducted by James Vere, also uses data from the HRS to look at the 
effects of Social Security benefit reductions on the labor supply of seniors. Instead of fo-
cusing on the repeal of the earnings test, Vere takes advantage of the 1977 Social Security 
Amendments which created the Social Security ‘notch’ and “led to a large, unanticipated 
reduction in Social Security benefits for those born after January 1, 1917.”23 Although he 
never specifically calculates an estimated elasticity of labor supply, Vere does find that for 
an average worker, an annual $1,000 (2005 dollars) reduction in benefits will increase labor 
supply by an average of 0.9 hours a week (28 percent).24 The response is even greater for 
singles, spouses of beneficiaries and the less-educated elderly.
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Vere also notes, however, that previous studies have found that “Social Security 
income… [has] negligible effects on elderly workers” labor supply.25 The most notable of 
these studies, Krueger and Pischke (1992), found that “labor supply continued to decline 
for the ‘notch babies’ who received lower Social Security benefits than earlier cohorts.”26 
That is to say, “growth in Social Security wealth can not explain much of the decline in 
male labor supply.”27
The Model
Theoretical Framework
Unlike the previously mentioned studies, this paper does not attempt to arrive at a specific 
estimate of labor force elasticity for seniors, nor does it examine the problem with an ex-
amination of panel data. Instead we study labor force participation with a time series analy-
sis. By controlling for other socioeconomic factors, we hope to isolate the effect of policy 
changes on labor force participation rate. Additionally, by running separate regressions for 
men and women in four different age groups, we hope to be able to shed light on variation 
in work incentives over a career and between genders.
For this model we use an Ordinary Least Squares estimator. We consider all vari-
ables to be linear, and we include a time trend to capture the overall trend in the data.28 
We report Newey-West Standard Errors to help overcome problems related to unspecified 
autocorrelation in the data.
The Data
The data for this study were collected from a sample size of 45 years from 1963-2007. Our 
approach is to attempt to define Labor Force Participation as a function of two key policy 
variables. The first is a measure of real per capita Medicare expenditures, as obtained from 
the Center for Medicare Studies.29 The second is the real social security benefit that could 
be expected for a retiree that year at an average earnings level with a 47 year career. These 
benefits were calculated using settings included in the “ANY PIA” Benefit Calculator pub-
lished by the Social Security Administration. 
In the course of this study, it is necessary to control for several societal and econom-
ic factors. The first and most obvious is the health of the overall economy, measured by the 
growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). However, because there is good reason 
to suspect that retirees may alter their labor force participation differently in response to 
increases in consumption spending rather than other GDP factors (investment, government 
spending or net exports), we separate the personal consumption growth rate and include 
it as a separate variable. We also include the inflation rate, real average wage rate and the 
poverty rate. Respectively, these variables control for economic uncertainty resulting from 
changes in the price level, the incentive effects caused by changes in worker compensation 
and the negative incentives caused by economic hardship.
We also control for societal factors like retirement wealth, education, and health. 
We have included the real Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) at the start of each year 
as a proxy for retirement wealth, which we expect to be negatively correlated with labor 
force participation. We also include the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s de-
gree as a measure of human capital and education level, which we expect to be positively 
correlated with labor force participation. To control for health considerations, we include 
a measure of the life expectancy (for a 65 year-old) in terms of remaining years of life,30 
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which we expect will be positively correlated with labor force participation. Additionally 
we include real per capita national health expenditures (less Medicare) which we also ex-
pect to be positively correlated with labor force participation.
Several data sources required adjustment. Data on life expectancy, educational at-
tainment and per capita national health expenditures were projected for some years us-
ing linear interpolation. Missing data for the poverty rate31, educational attainment32, life 
expectancy33 and real average wage rate34 were backcast and/or forecast with appropriate 
models. For more information on data, including sources, see Table 2. 
Results
The full results of all 8 regressions are included in Table 2. Unfortunately, the regres-
sions yielded mixed results when it comes to the policy variables in question. For 6 of 8 
demographic groups either one or the other of the policy variables (Medicare and Social 
Security) was a statistically significant indicator at a 95% confidence level, however in 
only one regression were both variables statistically significant.35 Of the two policy vari-
ables, Medicare seems to be the more important of the two (it was statistically significant 
for 5 out of 8 demographic groups) whereas Social Security was statistically significant in 
only 2 of 8 demographic groups and was never a statistically significant variable for men.
Most interestingly, both variables, when statistically significant, were significant in 
the opposite direction of the theoretical expectations. Where significant, both the Medicare 
and the Social Security variables were positively correlated with labor force participation – 
that is to say, ceteris paribus, increases in Medicare and Social Security benefits are likely 
to correspond to increases in labor force participation rates. For Social Security, there is 
little theoretical explanation for such a result, and it will clearly not hold at extremes; at 
a certain point, Social Security benefit increases must become strong enough to decrease 
labor force participation rate. On the Medicare side, the result may be explained by health 
benefits leading to increased labor force participation rates, but this seems unlikely, due 
first to the primary payer rule for Medicare (that is, Medicare benefits are rarely received 
by those who remain in the workforce) and second to the lack of any significance for the 
national health expenditure variables.
The regressions also yielded many results that theory would predict. The poverty 
rate among the senior population was positively correlated with labor force participation 
at a statistically significant level in all 8 demographic groups. Education was also a strong 
indicator of labor force participation, with a statistically significant relationship existing in 
6 of 8 demographic groups.36 The real average wage rate also showed positive statistically 
significant relationships in 4 of 8 demographic groups. For all three variables, the relation-
ships, even when not statistically significant, remained positive, indicating that these are 
likely to be generally positive correlations in all regressions, even where no statistical 
significance can be discerned.
The regressions hold one final surprise. Theory might predict a strong positive rela-
tionship between the Dow Jones Industrial Average and Labor Force participation, which 
was statistically significant for 5 of the 8 demographics. Originally, the DJIA had been 
included as a proxy for retirement wealth, and we expected the DJIA to be negatively cor-
related with labor force participation, as increases in retirement wealth would encourage 
seniors to retire. Our intuition, however, is apparently incorrect, as any positive effect of in-
creased retirement wealth is being overridden by some other consequence of this variable.
It is possible that the DJIA is a predictor of people’s expectations about economic 
performance. If so, increases in the DJIA may be positively correlated with senior labor 
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force participation because they are positively correlated with labor force participation 
more generally. When times are good businesses hire more workers, when they are bad, 
business cuts back. Ordinarily, we would look to the GDP and consumption variables to 
control for this effect, but labor force decisions are based expectations of economic perfor-
mance, not the performance itself. There is reason to believe that the DJIA tracks economic 
expectations more closely than GDP or consumption, and for this reason, it may be pos-
sible that it is a better indicator of labor force participation. At any rate, there must be some 
explanation for this surprising trend. The relationship can not be written off to co-linearity 
because labor force participation rates have been trending downward during the same pe-
riod of time that the DJIA has been trending up.
Conclusions
Labor Force Participation is Better Explained at Younger Ages
One important point to draw from the regressions is that, for men, the regressions yield 
progressively weaker fits as age increases.37 Table 2 includes F-Tests for all 8 regressions. 
This significant downward trend in model fit is strong evidence that labor force participa-
tion decisions are better explained by the economic, social and policy factors controlled for 
by the model at younger ages. As workers grow progressively older, they seem to be less 
likely to respond to these factors, preferring instead to enjoy the benefits of retirement. It is 
likely that individual labor force participation decisions are increasingly influenced by the 
unique circumstances of a particular retiree – circumstances like personal health, family 
considerations, geographic location or personal preferences for work vs. retirement. 
This effect is less pronounced for women, largely due, we believe, to changing cul-
tural attitudes toward a woman’s role in the workplace. This cultural change for women 
introduces a significant amount of noise, in addition to complicating intergenerational 
comparisons. New ideas about women in the workplace arrived at different times and in 
different ways for women in the 70+ age group than those in the 55+ age group.
For policy makers, the lesson to be taken from this analysis is that policies designed 
to promote labor force participation at the margin of retirement should account for the 
decreasing elasticity of labor supply relative to the economic, social and policy variables 
under consideration as a worker’s career continues. Our study suggests that policies aimed 
at the 55-64 age brackets are likely to be more effective than those aimed at the 65+ age 
bracket.
Medicare Benefits Tend to Increase Labor Force Participation
In 5 of 8 regressions,38 Medicare benefits exhibited a statistically significant positive 
correlation with labor force participation. There is a possible partial explanation for the 
Medicare variable: increased health coverage leads to healthier seniors who are more ca-
pable of having longer, more productive careers. It is possible that Medicare is keeping 
them in the workforce for longer periods of time by extending the length of time they are 
medically able to hold a job. There is, however, a reason to be suspicious of this claim: per 
capita national health expenditures (less Medicare) were only a significant variable in one 
of the eight demographic groups. A more likely explanation is that employers are able to 
shift employee healthcare costs onto Medicare in spite of the primary payer rule discussed 
earlier, thereby decreasing their costs and either increasing employee compensation or re-
ducing wages and internal pressure to force employees into retirement. This would seem 
to indicate that an elimination of the primary payer rule would indeed increase labor force 
participation.
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Potential Retirees Do Not Appear to Consider Social Security Benefit Levels
With two exceptions for the oldest of women’s demographics, Social Security benefit lev-
els do not appear to be correlated in any way with labor force participation. Our results 
appear to corroborate Krueger and Pischke’s original findings that Social Security benefit 
levels do not seem to explain much of the changes in labor force participation. As a result, 
at first blush, it seems as if many of the policy recommendations examined earlier would 
not have the desired effect of increasing labor force participation among the elderly.
However, there is still cause to be skeptical of this claim. It is logically clear that at 
some theoretical benefit level, Social Security would begin to play an important role in in-
fluencing labor force participation rates. If Social Security paid out benefits in the millions 
of dollars per worker, nearly all workers would choose retirement. At the same time, with-
out a Social Security program, many would continue to work. It is likely that past data sim-
ply do not contain sufficient amount of variation to detect this relationship. All we can say 
with any degree of confidence is that variation in benefit levels within the range we have 
observed in the past is unlikely to elicit any significant change in labor force participation.
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Domestic Product, Inflation and Personal Consumption variables.
 35 For the demographic group of Women age 55-61, Medicare expenditures, while not statis-
tically significant, come very close to significance, with a T-Test value of 0.0690. This would mean 
that at least one policy variable was statistically significant in 7 of 8 regressions and that in 6 of 8 
regressions, the Medicare variable exhibited a statistically significant relationship.
 36 The two demographic groups in which education was not statistically significant (women 
55-61 and women 62-64) showed generally lower levels of significance in other variables as well, for 
reasons we will discuss later.
 37 One exception to this trend is the regression for the 65-69 age bracket, which has, by far, 
the smallest F-Statistic. It is likely that this is the result of a significant amount of noise generated at 
age 65 by the Normal Retirement Age (NRA). As the NRA moves upward to age 67 over the coming 
years, further study may be necessary to examine whether this noise moves as well.
38 6 of 8, if a T-Test of 0.069 for Women Age 55-61 is included.
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Variable Source Location
Labor Force Participation 
Rate, Men Age 55-61
Bureau of Labor Statistics
http://www.agingstats.gov/Agingstatsdotnet/Main_
Site/Data/2006_Documents/OA_2006.pdf
LFPR, Men Age 62-64
LFPR, Men Age 65-69
LFPR, Men Age 70+
LFPR, Women Age 55-61
LFPR, Women Age 62-64
LFPR, Women Age 65-69
LFPR, Women Age 70+
Consumer Price Index Bureau of Labor Statistics ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt
% Change in Real GDP Less 
Consumption
St. Louis Federal Reserve http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/
GDPA?cid=106
% Change in Real 
Consumption
St. Louis Federal Reserve http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/series/
downloaddata?seid=PCECA&cid=110
Inflation Bureau of Labor Statistics ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt
Top Marginal Tax Rate
1963-2002: Internal Revenue 
Service
1963-2002: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/02inpetr.pdf 
2002-2007: Tax Foundation 2002-2007: http://www.taxfoundation.org/publica-
tions/show/151.html
Poverty Rate for the 
Population over Age 65
Federal Interagency Forum on 
Aging-Related Statistics
http://www.agingstats.gov/agingstatsdotnet/Main_
Site/Data/2008_Documents/tables/Indicator%20
7%20-%20Poverty.xls
% of the Population with a 
Bachelor’s Degree
Federal Interagency Forum on 
Aging-Related Statistics
http://www.agingstats.gov/agingstatsdotnet/Main_
Site/Data/2008_Documents/tables/Indicator%20
4%20-%20Educational%20Attainment.xls
Beginning of Year Real 
DJIA
ChartFilter http://www.chartfilter.com/djia/overview.htm
Life Expectancy for Men at 
Age 65
Center for Disease Control
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/
Publications/Health_US/hus07tables/Table027.xlsLife Expectancy for Women 
at Age 65
Real National Health 
Expenditures (Less 
Medicare)
Center for Medicare Studies http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf
Real Average Wage Rate St. Louis Federal Reserve http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf
Real Per Capita Medicare 
Expenditures
Center for Medicare Studies http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf
Real Average Hypothetical 
Social Security Benefit
Social Security Administration http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/anypia/anypia.html
Table 1: Data and Sources
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